

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

TRUSOV STATEMENT, MARCH 14, 1975

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALREADY ADDRESSED THE
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN DEFINING THE STRATEGIC WEAPON
DELIVERY VEHICLES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE MAXIMUM LEVEL OF
2,400 UNITS.

TODAY I INTEND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
ON SOME OF THESE DEFINITIONS.

AS YOU KNOW, ACCORDING TO THE AGREED STATEMENT OF
MAY 26, 1972, LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS ARE UNDERSTOOD
TO BE LAUNCHERS FOR STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABLE
OF RANGES IN EXCESS OF THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN THE
NORTHWESTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL USSR AND THE NORTH-
EASTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL U.S.

THIS IS A COMPLETELY PRECISE AND CLEAR UNDERSTANDNIG
WHICH HAS NOT CAUSED ANY AMBIGUITIES OR UNCERTAINTIES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AND QUITE OBVIOUSLY

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PRECLUDES THEIR APPEARANCE DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW

AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING APPLIES TO LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS; AND RIGHTLY SO, SINCE IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH IS BEING WORKED OUT, THE LIMITATION ALSO APPLIES TO LAUNCHERS FOR THESE MISSILES, AND IT IS PRECISELY THESE THAT ARE TO BE COUNTED IN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE LEVEL OF 2,400 UNITS. THE DEFINITION OF THE RANGE OF THESE MISSILES ALSO HAS A DEEP MEANING. IT IS DEFINED AS A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN THE NORTHWESTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL USSR AND THE NORTHEASTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL U.S. SUCH A DEFINITION CONTAINS, ON THE ONE HAND, A COMPLETELY CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPECIFIC RANGE AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MOST FULLY REFLECTS THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS QUESTION AS IT APPLIES TO THE BILATERAL SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE IT REVEALS THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE IN CLEAR AND UNDERSTANDABLE TERMS.

THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION IN ITS STATEMENT OF MARCH 7, 1975, TO THE EFFECT THAT "DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL CRITERIA AND METHODS OF MEASUREMENT" MAKE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE NORTHEASTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL U.S. AND THE NORTHWESTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL USSR "SOMEWHAT IMPRECISE," CANNOT BE CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME THE DISTANCE BETWEEN VARIOUS POINTS ON THE GLOBE IS MEASURED WITH VERY GREAT PRECISION, IN ANY CASE CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN REQUIRED FOR THE DEFINITION UNDER CONSIDERATION,

IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE IS NO NEED TO CHANGE THE DEFINITION OF A LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHER, WHICH WAS ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, THIS DEFINITION MUST BE RETAINED ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL

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THE END OF 1985.

THE QUESTION OF SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES WAS ALSO THE SUBJECT OF COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION BY THE SIDES. AS A RESULT, THE SCC PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES, SIGNED BY THE SIDES ON JULY 3, 1974, FORMULATES A PRECISE DEFINITION, ACCORDING TO WHICH " MODERN SLBMS ARE: FOR THE USSR, MISSILES OF THE TYPE INSTALLED IN

NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES MADE OPERATIONS SINCE 1965; FOR THE U.S., MISSILES INSTALLED IN ALL NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES; AND, FOR BOTH PARTIES, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES FIRST FLIGHT-TESTED SINCE 1965 AND INSTALLED IN ANY SUBMARINE, REGARDLESS OF TYPE." THIS WORDING, WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF THESE SYSTEMS BY THE SIDES, IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING AND IT, TOO, MUST BE RETAINED IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED STATEMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. EXCLUSION OF INDIVIDUAL WORDS FROM THIS AGREED LANGUAGE, ADOPTED BY THE SIDES LESS THAN A YEAR AGO, SIGNIFICANTLY MODIFYING ITS MEANING, CANNOT BE REGARDED AS JUSTIFIED.

THE QUESTION OF DEFINING HEAVY BOMBERS HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE DELEGATIONS AT THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL. THE USSR DELEGATION PROVIDED A PRECISE AND CLEAR DEFINITION OF WHICH NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT MUST BE CLASSIFIED AS HEAVY BOMBERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WERE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION GIVEN IN THE U.S. DRAFT AGREEMENT I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING.

PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 STATES THAT THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES INCLUDED "HEAVY BOMBERS IF THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF FIRING OF NO MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS,"

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AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. DRAFT PROPOSES TO CLASSIFY AS HEAVY BOMBERS "TYPES" OF AIRCRAFT "HOWEVER CONFIGURED." THE STATEMENT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION OF MARCH 7, 1975 CONTAINS A CLARIFICATION, ACCORDING TO WHICH HEAVY BOMBERS ALSO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURED FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE OR REFUELING. HERE WE HAVE A QUITE OBVIOUS INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE U.S. PROPOSAL AND THE AIDE-MEMOIRE BY WHICH WE MUST BE STRICTLY GUIDED.

AS FOR THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT CALLED "BACKFIRE" BY THE U.S. SIDE, WE HAVE ALREADY SAID AND NOW REAFFIRM THAT THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR INCLUDING IT IN THE CATEGORY OF HEAVY BOMBERS.

THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT HEAVY BOMBERS ARE

NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT: FOR THE U.S.--B-52 AND B-1,
FOR THE USSR--TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV, AS WELL AS
NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED, HAVING CHARACTER-
ISTICS SIMILAR TO THE B-1 BOMBER.

SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING COULD BE RECORDED IN THE FORM
OF AN AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW
AGREEMENT.

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